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Abstract: Although many countries have included biodiversity offsetting (BO) requirements in 
their environmental regulations over the past four decades, this mechanism has recently been 
the object of renewed political interest. Incorporated into the mitigation hierarchy in three 
steps aimed at avoiding, reducing and offsetting residual impacts on biodiversity arising 
from development projects, BO is promoted as the way to achieve the political goal of No 
Net Loss of biodiversity (NNL). The recent success of BO is mainly based on its ability to 
provide economic incentives for biodiversity conservation. However, the diversity of BO 
mechanisms (direct offsets, banking mechanism and offsetting funds) and the various institutional 
frameworks within which they are applied generate substantial confusion about their 
economic and ecological implications. In this article, we first analyze the rationale for the BO 
approach from the welfare and ecological economics. We show that both these frameworks 
support the use of BO to address environmental externalities, but that they differ in how they 
consider the substitutability issue and levels of sustainability with regard to natural and 
manufactured capital, and in how they address ecological concerns. We then examine the 
economic and ecological performance criteria of BO from conceptual and empirical 
perspectives. We highlight that the three BO mechanisms involve different economic and 
ecological logics and inherent benefits, but also potential risks in meeting biodiversity 
conservation targets. We lastly investigate the ecological constraints with respect to the BO 
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practice, and economic and organizational limitations of the BO system that may impede 
achievement of NNL goals. We then reveal the existence of a tension between the economic 
and ecological rationales in conducting BO that requires making choices about the NNL 
policy objectives. Finally, this article questions the place of BO in conservation policies and 
discusses the trade-off between political will and ecological opportunities involved in the 
BO approach. 
Keywords: biodiversity conservation; biodiversity offsets; ecological compensation; 
economic incentives; environmental policies; human well-being; natural capital; no net loss; 
substitutability; weak and strong sustainability 
 
1. Introduction 
Over the last two decades, environmental policies have increasingly used economic incentives for 
biodiversity conservation as more efficient ways of achieving conservation outcomes than traditional 
approaches [1]. Seen as a way to provide economic incentives, the concept of biodiversity offsetting 
(henceforth BO) has recently enjoyed renewed political interest, and is endorsed in many political 
agendas [2]. Whilst BO requirements have been appearing in the environmental regulations of many 
countries since the 1970s (but rarely implemented in practice [3]), BO has recently re-emerged in biodiversity 
strategies across national and international policies as the main innovative tool for biodiversity conservation 
worldwide [4]. Embodying a regulatory requirement, BO is primarily incorporated by law into the mitigation 
hierarchy in three steps aimed at avoiding, reducing and offsetting residual impacts on biodiversity arising 
from development projects [5]. The purpose of BO is to provide ecological gains counterbalancing negative 
impacts on biodiversity. In a context of economic development, BO is considered the main way to achieve 
the goal of No Net Loss (henceforth NNL) of biodiversity, currently being a central political objective [6]. 
In practice, the BO principle encompasses three main mechanisms: (1) direct offsets, requiring 
developers to carry out compensatory measures themselves through restoration actions or acquisitions 
of natural areas in which appropriate conservation plans are implemented; (2) the banking mechanism, 
whereby a third party called a bank operator implements larger restoration projects ahead of future impacts, 
generating thereby offsetting credits for future needs of developers; and (3) offsetting funds, organized 
by certain environmental organizations (public agencies or non-governmental conservation organizations)  
in order to collect money from developers to carry out restoration actions or conservation projects [7]. 
How these different mechanisms are used and regulated depends on the legislation and the institutional 
environments of each country [8]. In addition to this, there are also voluntary offsets in which developers 
propose offsets outside legal requirements, but we do not propose to treat them in this paper.  
The rationale for the BO approach is to achieve ecological outcomes in a more efficient way than 
in traditional political approaches, being commonly regarded as a market-based instrument (henceforth 
MBI) [9]. Yet, while BO is often regarded as an MBI for biodiversity both in academic and political 
spheres (especially in the form of the banking mechanism), some recent articles have shown that BO 
mechanisms do not really share the characteristics of market or market-like instruments, either in theory 
or in practice [10,11]. However, most academics and policy-makers still value BO on economic grounds, 
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the revival of BO in environmental policies largely resting on its ability to promote economic incentives 
for biodiversity conservation. Overall, by allowing environmental outcomes to be achieved without 
limiting economic development, the concept of BO offers the promise of making economic development 
and growth compatible with biodiversity conservation [12]. 
In addition, the economic rationale behind the BO scheme has raised major concerns with both 
academics and conservationists especially with respect to ecological goals. For some, this approach gives 
rise to a commodification of biodiversity that tends to jeopardize biodiversity conservation instead of 
ensuring it [9,13]. These observations have raised questions about the limitations and risks of using the 
BO approach for biodiversity conservation. Recent reviews on BO emphasized the main conceptual and 
practical limitations involved in the implementation of offsets (e.g., specific problems associated with 
metrics, equivalence, timing, spatial, compliance, monitoring, etc.) [14,15]. 
However to date, the economic foundations of the BO concept have rarely been addressed in the 
scientific literature. Moreover, the diversity of the BO mechanisms and the various institutional frameworks 
within which they are applied generate substantial confusion about their economic and ecological 
implications. Far from being exclusively of academic interest, analyzing the economic rationales of the 
BO approach should yield a better understanding of the functioning of its mechanisms, and help in 
dealing with their economic and ecological limitations. 
In this article, we conduct such an analysis in three parts. First we examine the overall economic 
foundations and rationales for the BO approach to biodiversity conservation from an economics perspective. 
Whilst it is possible to address the overall rationale behind the BO scheme, we assume that the performance 
criteria of BO will vary across the three different BO mechanisms. We address this issue in the second 
part in two complementary ways. First, from a conceptual perspective, we examine the performance criteria 
of BO according to NNL policy goals and the type of equivalence targeted. Then, from an empirical 
perspective, we conduct a systematic analysis of the three different BO mechanisms in three steps  
by first describing their functioning, secondly pointing out their economic and ecological benefits, and 
thirdly highlighting their main risks. Finally, in the third part of this article, we discuss the main 
economic and ecological structural limitations and challenges of the BO approach when it comes to 
meeting biodiversity conservation objectives. 
2. Economic Foundations and Rationales for the BO Approach 
The principal objective behind the BO approach is to maintain biodiversity so as to achieve NNL  
of biodiversity in contexts where biodiversity losses occurred from development projects. BO is  
thus primarily addressed through the legal framework of Environmental Impacts Assessment [16].  
In order to obtain permits, and in compliance with the mitigation hierarchy, developers are required to 
take compensatory measures to offset their environmental impacts leading to provide equivalent 
biodiversity gains. In most countries, environmental regulations aimed at in-kind offsetting mainly 
targeting “like-for-like” equivalence. This means that offset projects are designed according to ecological 
outcomes through actions of restoration, rehabilitation, creation or preservation of species and 
ecosystems [7,17]. In this perspective, regulatory frameworks only take into account the ecological gains 
provided by BO projects, regardless of the social or economic impacts of biodiversity losses. Thus, the 
rationale for using the BO system is primarily ecological. 
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However from an economics perspective, biodiversity losses represent social costs that go beyond 
the purely ecological level and need to be taken into account. Concern about the costs of loss of biodiversity 
has increased in recent years, especially since the publication of the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment 
reports [18] and The Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity reports [19]. These studies provide 
global economic assessments of biodiversity and ecosystem services, offering a general framework  
to link biodiversity and human well-being. They help to recognize that biodiversity underpins human  
well-being. In such a way, environmental losses are regarded as negative externalities that represent 
major costs for society and tend to reduce human well-being [20]. In this perspective, the main problems 
highlighted are decision-makers’ failure to take biodiversity losses into account in economic calculations, 
and the lack of policy tools encouraging the internalization of negative externalities resulting from 
biodiversity losses [19]. Following the finding that traditional approaches failed in meeting the expected 
conservation outcomes, economic incentives have increasingly been used by policy-makers over  
recent decades to address environmental concerns [2]. Incentive approach aims to encourage economic 
decision-makers to adopt good environmental practices by offering compensation or rewards to 
individuals in exchange for environmental services [12]. 
By combining a regulatory approach, through the polluter-pays principle, with an economic incentives 
structure, the BO approach gained increasingly credibility and interest in political spheres [21,22]. 
The BO approach, in addition to ensuring that the legal compensatory obligation is met, should 
provide three major economic incentives that will influence developers’ behavior and encourage good 
environmental practices. First, because BO represents significant costs for developers, it should be an 
incentive for developers to limit their impacts on biodiversity. Based on the insight that rational actors 
will perfectly weigh the economic costs and benefits of making their choices, developers are expected 
to minimize offsets, thereby reducing the impacts on biodiversity from their development projects. Second, 
the economic rationale of developers should lead them to comply with their offsetting requirements in 
the most efficient way, by seeking effective conservation projects [17]. Thus, if BO implementation is well 
framed and controlled by regulatory bodies, developers should in turn implement the best environmental 
practices by choosing the most cost-effective way to meet their offsets requirements (e.g., by using 
biodiversity banks). Lastly, through the financial benefits provided by some BO mechanisms, the BO 
system may provide incentives for private or public stakeholders to invest in conservation actions for 
economic reasons. The BO system can therefore exploit additional sources of funding for conservation 
actions, and may open the way to large and expensive conservation projects that probably could not have 
been implemented otherwise [23]. 
From the legal perspective, BO basically allows the internalization of negative externalities by requiring 
developers to offset the environmental losses they are causing. However, the rationale for the offsetting 
approach and the kind of offsets required can be regarded in different ways depending on the economics 
frameworks considered, especially with regard to welfare economics and ecological economics [24]. 
The main difference between these frameworks lies in how they consider the degree of substitution 
between the different forms of capital, especially natural capital and manufactured capital [25], and the 
different kinds of sustainability they imply [26,27]. 
Welfare economics aims to find solutions to internalize negative externalities (resulting for instance 
from development projects) in order to maintain the level of social welfare. In the welfare economics 
framework, the hypothesis is one of weak sustainability, meaning that manufactured and natural capital 
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can perfectly be substituted for each other: what matters for future generations is only the total aggregate 
stock of manufactured and natural capital, but not natural capital per se [26]. According to this viewpoint, 
there is high degree of substitution between manufactured and natural capital implying that natural 
capital may decrease as long as manufactured capital increases in accordance with maintaining human 
well-being. In this perspective, there is no reason to specifically preserve the natural capital [28,29]. 
However, what matters is to maintain the social welfare then expressed through the utility provided by 
the production of goods and services. Welfare theory is principally based on the Pareto-optimum 
principle which states “that social welfare is maximum when it is impossible to make anyone better off 
(i.e., happier or in a preferred situation) without making someone else worse off (with initial 
endowments)” [30]. According to this principle, economic activity is limited because no development 
projects can be Pareto-optimal since they give rise to negative externalities and decrease the utility of at 
least one individual [31]. A solution to overcome this problem lies in the Kaldor-Hicks compensation 
principle specifying that “as long as the sum of the total benefits of the project is greater than the sum of the 
total costs, a share of the benefits can be devoted to offsetting the social costs to meet the Pareto-optimality 
condition” [32,33]. In such situation, the compensation principle states that a change (e.g., resulting from 
development projects) is socially desirable if the individuals who are gaining from the new situation 
provide offsets to those who are suffering the losses. Moreover, if the costs of the offsets are borne by 
the developers and included in the total cost of the development project, the offsetting mechanism 
enables the internalization of negative externalities. The level of the offsets needed is assessed on the 
basis of the expected losses of utility. If losses of utility are assessed in monetary terms, offsets could be 
provided by financial gains. In this case, losses of natural capital will therefore be offset by financial 
gains instead of ecological gains. Thus, even if the welfare framework supports the use of offsetting to 
maintain the social welfare, high degree of substitution between the different types of capital is assumed 
(including natural capital and manufactured capital) because losses of natural capital are replaced by gains 
in other forms of capital. In this case, this is not about “biodiversity” offsetting but rather “utility” offsetting. 
However, the weak sustainability hypothesis can be regarded as over-optimistic in the light of recent works 
especially the TEEB and MEA reports leading to a very paradoxical situation called “the paradox of the 
environmentalist” [34,35]. Whereas values of biodiversity have been shown and the need to preserve it 
to maintain human well-being, it might be possible for the society to fall into an irreversible and highly 
degraded state of biodiversity while human well-being continues to increase, at least in the short term. 
With regard to this situation, if social welfare is to be maintained, utility losses resulting from 
biodiversity losses must be offset by gains in biodiversity and not by financial gains. Therefore in this 
case, beyond the hypothesis of high substitutability between the different forms of capital, a strong 
sustainability approach should be considered even in the welfare economics framework [36]. 
Conversely to this framework, the ecological economics approach is basically based on the strong 
sustainability criterion. This approach assumes that natural capital is an essential production factor, thus 
considering that natural capital and manufactured capital are complementary and not perfectly 
substitutable. The strong sustainability perspective defines ecological sustainability as “the natural limits 
set by the carrying capacity of the natural environment (physically, chemically and biologically), so that 
human use does not irreversibly impair the integrity and proper functioning of its natural processes and 
components” [37]. According to this viewpoint, a decrease in natural capital cannot be compensated for 
by an increase in manufactured capital [38]. In this case, offsetting cannot be financial and must result 
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in gains in natural capital to maintain its level. However, the strong sustainability approach raises the 
problem of choosing the critical natural capital to maintain, and the minimum threshold levels below 
which they must not fall [39]. 
In practice, the implementation of the BO principle in environmental regulations aimed at achieving 
the NNL objective takes the strong sustainability perspective. In the context of development projects, 
losses in natural capital must be offset by gains in natural capital, implying that natural capital and 
manufactured capital cannot be substituted for each other. Moreover, the setting of the NNL objective 
in environmental policies reveals public and political awareness of the need to preserve biodiversity. The 
NNL goal was set during George H.W. Bush’s campaign in 1988 in the United States of America (USA), 
initially to limit wetlands destruction [40]. The NNL objective then spread throughout the world, more 
recently becoming a political principle endorsed by many countries [6]. This commitment reveals the 
recognition of the various values and merits of biodiversity (social, economic and ecological) and the 
importance of maintaining natural capital by preserving it. Moreover, in contexts of strong ecological 
uncertainties about current and future biodiversity states and changes, incomplete knowledge about 
optimal levels of biodiversity, and when ecological extinctions are difficult to forecast [41], setting the NNL 
objective then represents a precautionary approach. According to the NNL perspective, two social choices 
are possible: either it is decided not to destroy the biodiversity that needs to be maintained, or it is decided 
to continue the economic and social developments because of their utility despite their environmental 
damages, but in this case, compensations for the destruction of biodiversity are involved. In this perspective, 
the BO principle represents the only way to reach the NNL objective. However, the level and type of 
ecological equivalence required between gains and losses depend on the equivalence criterion set in the 
NNL policy. The strict like-for-like equivalence represents for instance the highest levels of sustainability 
under BO regulations [3]. 
However, depending on the goals targeted in the NNL policy, different types of equivalence and 
associated offsetting can be provided. Indeed, the types of equivalence targeted in the BO system are 
closely linked to the goals of the NNL policies [3]. In line with Quétier et al. (2014), we examine from a 
conceptual perspective the various types of equivalence linked to NNL goals, and the associated BO 
baseline and metrics used to assess losses and gains in biodiversity (Table 1). When the NNL goal aims 
to maintain the level of human well-being, equivalence is based on the utility provided by the different 
forms of capital. In this case, losses of natural capital can be offset by gains in another capital, i.e., 
manufactured capital (line 1, Table 1). Monetary metrics can be used to assess losses and gains using 
cost-benefits analysis to assess benefits of development projects and costs of biodiversity losses. From 
this perspective, a weak sustainability approach is assumed as high degree of substitutability between 
capital (see section above). 
Conversely, when losses of natural capital must be offset by gains in natural capital, BO requires an 
ecological equivalence based on a strong sustainability approach. However, we propose to better reflect 
the practices of BO policies by introducing a finer distinction between the different components of 
natural capital based on three main approaches to biodiversity that are: ecosystem services, functional, 
and individual with species and habitats [42] (lines 2 to 4, Table 1). We further argue that these different 
approaches to natural capital involve different types of ecological equivalence and BO approaches. NNL 
goal can relate to ecosystem services that need to be maintained to human well-being. In this case, offsetting 
aims to replace ecosystem services damages. Ecological indicators tied to the different categories of 
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ecosystem services can be used to assess losses and gains in ecosystem services [43]. A functional 
approach to natural capital can also be considered, with BO aimed at maintaining NNL of ecological 
functions. Functional indicators can be used to assess losses and gains in ecological functions [44]. 
Lastly, through an NNL goal focused on an individual approach to biodiversity (i.e., species or habitats), 
BO is aimed at maintaining populations or communities of species or specific habitats. Here, biological 
indicators can be used to assess species (vegetal or animal) losses and gains [15]. These different 
approaches to biodiversity involve different ways of looking at biodiversity in particular with regard to 
the recognition of the complexity of its dynamics and processes (see Section 4.1).  
Table 1. Types of equivalence, offsetting and metrics across No Net Loss (NNL) policy goals. 
 NNL Goals Types of Equivalence Types of Offsetting 
Possible Metrics Used 
for Assessing Losses 
and Gains 
1 
Maintaining human  
well-being 
Equivalence in utility  
Forms of capital: 
losses in natural 
capital can be offset 
by gains in another 
capital (e.g., 
manufactured capital) 
Benefits of development 
projects versus values of 
biodiversity losses 




level of ecosystem 
services that are 








services by providing 
equivalent gains in 
ecosystem services 
Ecological indicators of 
ecosystem services by  
category (regulation, 
support, provision, 
cultural) (e.g.,  









Losses of ecological 
functions are offset 
by gains in the  
same ecological 
functions (e.g., 
habitat for species) 
Functional indicators 
(e.g., habitat area, 
density of vegetation) 
4 
Maintaining 
species and habitats 
Individual-based 
equivalence 
Offsetting aims to 
replace the same 
species populations 
or communities and 
habitats lost 
Biological indicators  
(e.g., presence/absence,  
species diversity) 
3. Economic and Ecological Analysis of the BO mechanisms Performance 
NNL policies commonly target, in practice, functional and individual (species or habitats) approaches 
to biodiversity to conduct BO. As stated above, three different mechanisms can be used to implement BO: 
direct offsets, banking mechanism and offsetting funds. We argue that economic and ecological criteria 
performance will vary among these three mechanisms [45]. 
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3.1. The Direct Offsets Approach 
Direct offsets involve the implementation of BO by the party responsible for environmental 
damages arising from development projects. In the US legislation, this system is commonly called “the 
permittee-responsible mitigation”. Offsets are single conservation projects tied to a given development 
project. In this way, each offsetting measure is defined and sized case by case in relation to specific quantified 
impacts [14]. Moreover, offsets are primarily carried out near the impacted area [7]. 
From an ecological perspective, this proximity between the offsetting site and the impacted area, 
combined with defining each offset in terms of one impact, should help reach the NNL objective through 
better ecological and geographical matching between biodiversity losses and gains [17]. However, for this 
direct offsets system to work, offsetting measures need to be properly incorporated into local conservation 
projects. Studies have shown that single offsets implemented regardless of local conservation projects and 
without being incorporated into spatial and temporal planning can lead to conservation failures [45]. Single 
offsets can also result in small and isolated conservation projects leading to ineffective conservation 
outcomes [46].  
From the economic and organizational perspectives, the direct offsets approach is considered as being 
inefficient. In the USA, at the end of the 1980s, two reports pointed to shortcomings in the application 
of BO through the direct offsets approach leading to biodiversity losses [47,48]. These failures actually 
revealed major organizational difficulties in the enforcement of offsets requirements through the direct 
approach. This inefficiency was mainly due to the high transaction costs generated by the implementation 
of biodiversity offsets in individual cases both for regulatory bodies and developers especially where 
large development projects are concerned [49]. Indeed, in the direct offsets system, the developers 
themselves are required to implement their offsetting measures. However, they generally do not have the 
necessary skills to conduct offsets that require significant expertise and specific knowledge. In this case, 
developers generally use service providers and experts to conduct their offsets, but this increases the 
financial costs of offsets measures. However, the level of expertise needed is highly dependent on the 
NNL goals and on the type of compensatory measure targeted [50]. For instance, preservation measures 
(i.e., purchasing an existing natural area in order to preserve it) require lower levels of expertise and 
knowledge than restoration or creation actions [50]. However, the implementation of BO requirements 
through preservation actions raises strong concerns among scholars and conservationists in relation to 
the issue of the additionality of compensatory measures to meet the NNL goal [14]. In the USA, since BO 
regulations were reinforced, restoration measures have accounted for the highest proportion of direct 
offsets measures carried out (42% [51]); in contrast, such measures account for the smallest proportion 
of offsets in France (17% [52]). For the regulatory bodies responsible for the enforcement and 
monitoring of BO, offsets carried out through the direct approach generate high transaction costs too. This 
approach requires regulatory bodies to control and monitor as many offset projects as development projects, 
which generates significant transaction costs and makes it difficult to enforce offsetting liabilities [49,50].  
In the USA, this inefficiency of the direct offsets system led to the implementation of the banking 
mechanism in early 1990s in response to these economic and ecological flaws [13]. 
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3.2. The BO Banking Mechanism 
The BO banking is an innovative organizational form that emerged to meet offsetting requirements. 
Through this approach, a third part called an operator carries out offsetting measures on behalf of 
developers by creating an offsetting bank. This bank is composed of biodiversity credits corresponding 
to ecological gains provided by the bank operator. These gains generally result from restoration actions 
conducted ahead of future development projects that have been checked and approved by regulatory 
bodies before being used to offset developers’ impacts. Thus, an offsetting bank serves to offset several and 
various impacts arising from different development projects. One of the main differences between this 
approach and the direct offsets approach is the transfer of responsibility from the developers to the bank 
operator in conducting and monitoring the compensatory measures over time (note that the period of 
liability depends on national regulations; under US law it is forever because conservation easements are 
linked to offsetting banks, while in France, the average period is about thirty years [53]). Legal 
responsibility for offsets can also be transferred to the bank operator, but this too depends on the 
regulatory framework (transfer is possible under the US law whereas in France the developer retains legal 
liability [53]). The banking mechanism actually encompasses various schemes under different names 
according to regulatory and institutional frameworks and to the type of biodiversity targeted (e.g., species 
or habitat bank, wetland mitigation bank, biobank). The bank operator can be a private or a public 
organization or individuals, and the offsetting bank can be commercial or non-commercial [7]. 
From an ecological perspective, the banking mechanism is supposed providing better conservation 
outcomes than in the direct offsets approach. First, by pooling various small offset actions within a larger 
offsetting project, the banking mechanism better guarantees ecological and conservation successes [54,55]. 
Combining the offsetting liabilities of several developers over a larger area providing greater ecological 
benefits increases the chances of successful offsets coming from biodiversity banks. Moreover, planning 
in advance for offsets through the banking mechanism encourages the right choice of offset sites and 
actions to be made in relation to local conservation issues. In addition, the banking approach helps 
prevent temporary losses of biodiversity by providing biodiversity gains ahead of future ecological 
impacts [56]. Indeed, a major argument for the ecological benefits provided by biodiversity banking is 
the effective temporal and spatial strategy that the mechanism encourages, in terms of offset locations 
and types (i.e., ecological actions) [45]. Advance checking and approval by federal agencies of the 
ecological results that the bank proposes to offset future impacts also limits offsets failures [57]. Lastly, 
depending on the level of asset specificity set by regulations, the banking system can even aim for 
significant environmental gains, leading to good ecological restoration projects. 
However, although the banking mechanism was expected to ensure ecological success, many case 
studies have revealed difficulties and failures in achieving NNL of biodiversity [58,59]. These findings 
have led to an extensive academic debate on the relevance of such tools for biodiversity conservation [60,61]. 
On technical concerns, some studies revealed particular problems in relation to spatial issues and restoration 
results [62,63]. Contrary to the direct offsets approach, the banking mechanism necessarily implies off-site 
offsets and greater gaps between losses and gains in biodiversity, despite the definition of a specific 
service area (i.e., a geographic area in which the bank can sell its credits; in the US wetland mitigation 
banking, this is usually a sub-basin area from 255 km2 to 3544 km2 in size, depending on the State [64]). 
Indeed, this mechanism requires a sufficiently large area for the offsetting market to function properly 
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(increasing offsets demand), which tends to reduce the geographical equivalence between ecological losses 
and gains. Moreover, due to the possibility of offsetting for multiple impacts via the same environmental 
gain, asset specificity is decreased [50]. Thus, as biodiversity offsets are not sized and carried out 
according to one specific ecological impact, the ecological equivalence between biodiversity losses and 
gains is supposed to be weaker than in direct offsets. In fact, for the banking mechanism to function properly, 
biodiversity credits need to be sufficiently standardized to be equivalent to several ecological impacts. 
From the economic and organizational perspectives, the BO banking mechanism is commonly 
regarded as an MBI both in academic and political spheres (although some academics have challenged 
its implementation as such [64,65]). In theory, MBIs are expected to reach any desired level of ecological 
objectives in the most efficient way (i.e., at the lowest cost) if they are properly designed and 
implemented [66]. In the case of BO, the desired level corresponds to the NNL objective that requires 
impacts on biodiversity to be offset. Due to specific features of the banking mechanism, this approach 
is expected to be the most efficient way to implement offsets [67]. The banking mechanism can be also 
regarded as an economic incentive for both developers and bank operators (see Section 2). Developers and 
bank operators are expected to find the most efficient ways to carry out offsets [66]. The main advantage 
of the banking mechanism lies in the use of an intermediary, which greatly reduces transaction costs for 
developers and regulatory bodies [49]. Through this mechanism, developers transfer the costs of 
implementation, management and monitoring of offsets to bank operators strongly limiting their 
transaction costs. Even though regulatory bodies spend time setting up an offsetting bank, once the bank 
is operational, less time and work are required to check and monitor offsets than with direct offsets, due 
to economies of scale. Thus, regulatory bodies can ensure better control and monitoring of offsets, 
leading to better enforcement of environmental regulations [50]. As for bank operators, even though they 
bear the transaction costs tied to offsets, they can achieve cost-effective implementation of offsets by 
taking advantage of the economies of scale resulting from large offsetting projects [68].  
Turning briefly to the social dimension, the banking mechanism fosters the development of partnerships 
between parties who do not usually interact. Implementing an offsetting bank leads various stakeholders 
(public, private, organizations or individuals) from different sectors (business, conservation, agriculture) 
to exchange views on environmental issues. The banking mechanism encourages them to communicate 
and share, in order to balance their different goals. However, the banking mechanism also raises social 
inequality issues. The main concern is that those benefitting from offsets are not those suffering as a 
result of ecological losses. The banking mechanism implies a spatial gap between the impact and offsetting 
areas, meaning that the people who benefit from compensatory measures are not likely to be those who 
suffer from the environmental damage [69]. Although this issue deserves to be explored further, it is 
beyond the scope of this article. 
The performance of the offsetting market depends on two main parameters: (1) the enforcement of 
offsetting liabilities that defines the offset demand (type of credits and quantity); and (2) the rules of the 
biodiversity banking system that determine the supply of offset credits (mainly the definition of ecological 
and geographical equivalence criteria setting the limits of the service area and the degree of asset 
specificity required). These two parameters actually depend on the institutional and legal contexts behind 
the BO device. The performance of the banking mechanism is, in fact, highly dependent on institutional 
and political choices.  
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From an empirical perspective, following the reports highlighting the inefficiency of the BO  
system in the USA, in 2008 the government set up the Final Rule to “improve the quality and success of 
compensatory mitigation projects” [51]. The definition of the 2008 Final Rule greatly reinforced the legal 
liabilities connected with BO by defining a specific framework, improving the control and monitoring 
of offsets, and providing precise rules (e.g., definition of a standardized method to assess ecological 
equivalence, requirement for funds for long term management, setting up a conservation easement, better 
organization of the banking system, etc.) [64]. Through the 2008 Final Rule, the US government encouraged 
developers to use the banking mechanism to conduct their offsets due to the banks’ ecological and economic 
efficiency. The strong decrease in transaction costs to developers allowed through the banking mechanism 
and the reinforcement of regulations gave developers a stronger incentive to use this mechanism to meet 
their offsetting liabilities. 
3.3. Offsetting Funds 
In the offsetting funds system, also called “in-lieu fee mitigation” under the US legislation, developers 
pay a fee to specific entities, which differ depending on regulations (government, public agencies,  
non-governmental organizations, municipalities or environmental organizations). This mechanism also 
involves a third party who collects money from the developers and takes financial and legal responsibility 
for the success of offsets [70]. In this mechanism, the link between financial transfers and ecological 
gains is less direct and clear. Studies of offsetting fund programs showed that these payments often result 
in poorly planned offsetting projects that do not provide sufficient ecological and geographical 
equivalences with impacts [71]. The performance criteria are less demanding than in the banking or 
direct offsets mechanisms (with regard to management funds, equivalence assessment methods, control 
and monitoring of offsets implementation) [72]. Moreover, offsetting fund programs often provide offsets 
well after impacts occur. Thus, in most cases, offsetting funds do not provide sufficient guarantees that 
NNL of biodiversity will be achieved.  
Offsetting fund programs face a risk of underestimating the funds required to conduct and achieve 
offsetting projects, or even to failure to perform the expected ecological actions [73]. In addition, the 
unclear link between the impacts of projects and offsetting requirements may mean that developers fail 
to take biodiversity into account when planning development projects [7]. In practice, offsetting funds 
are rarely incorporated into regulatory frameworks; they are often accepted in exceptional cases or in 
addition to other offsetting measures [7]. 
4. Main Structural Limitations for the BO Approach in Meeting the Biodiversity  
Conservation Objectives 
4.1. Ecological Limitations  
 Limitations in integrating ecological knowledge through BO practices 
A major limitation of the BO system is that it is primarily based on incomplete and imprecise scientific 
knowledge regarding biodiversity and conservation issues [17]. Most of the practice of BO implicitly 
rests on scientific knowledge in the fields of ecology, conservation biology and ecological restoration. 
These disciplines remain relatively young scientific areas and face strong uncertainties with regard  
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both to understanding biodiversity and its dynamics, and to predicting how it will evolve in a changing 
world [74,75]. In this context, the ecological success of BO remains uncertain and hard to predict. 
Restoration actions in particular have yielded mixed results, revealing difficulties in the recovery of the 
whole targeted ecosystem, with substantial and unrecovered ecological losses [54,62]. 
In addition to imprecise scientific knowledge, the BO system is conceptually impaired by the inherent 
difficulty of applying the most recent advances in ecology and conservation biology. Indeed, due to 
technical and operational limitations (e.g., time and spatial constraints in conducting environmental 
impact assessments and designing appropriate offsets), BO is constrained in practice to taking partial 
account of ecological scientific knowledge. Actually, the BO process is hardly influenced by current 
progress in scientific ecology, and a major gap is likely to result from the continuous mismatch between 
recent ecological researches and how biodiversity is treated in the BO process [76,77]. For instance, BO 
tends to consider species and habitats as isolated and static features of the ecosystem. However, this 
approach ignores a decade of research in ecology that has demonstrated the importance of adopting an 
even more systemic approach to biodiversity (i.e., accounting for biodiversity dynamics, ecological 
interactions and processes) to consider higher degrees of ecological complexity (we define here 
ecological complexity by the property of ecological systems to be structured by multiple links and 
ecological interactions, emergent processes and non-linear dynamics) (Figure 1). Biodiversity responses 
to disturbance, for example, often show non-linear and not instantaneous dynamics [78]. Besides, in adopting 
a temporally and spatially restricted view of biodiversity during the assessment of losses, BO ignores 
the biodiversity potentially present (so called “dark-diversity”) [79]. The BO process also hardly considers 
the dynamics of biodiversity that result from processes interacting at different spatial scales from local to 
global [80]. Moreover, extinction debts may also be expressed long after disturbances, especially for species 
with long generation times, posing a major challenge for biodiversity conservation and BO [81,82]. 
This complex view of biodiversity makes it clear that biodiversity cannot be reduced to some of 
its isolated components (e.g., species or habitat), functions or utility (e.g., by adopting the lens of 
ecosystem services). 
Moreover, switching from a systemic approach of biodiversity in the BO process to more functional 
or services approaches involves strong reductions in considering ecological complexity and represents 
an incomplete and less accurate view of biodiversity (Figure 1). First, ecosystem services are based on 
ecological functions which are judged to be useful to humans [83]. Therefore, one ecosystem service can be 
provided by different ecological functions. A complex lattice of species’ interactions, functional traits 
and dynamics are involved in ecosystem productivity, with varying degrees of usefulness. Ecosystem 
services are therefore only partially related to certain ecological functions; but many ecological functions 
cannot be equated with ecosystem services and can even constitute disservices (e.g., pollination is a function 
equated with a service for fruit production but with a disservice if invasive species are pollinated). There 
is no need for biodiversity to provide various ecosystem services that can be actually accomplished by 
human technologies (e.g., construction of a water treatment plant to provide the service of wastewater 
purification, pollination by hand to provide the pollination service).  
Second, adopting a functional approach gives an incomplete view of biodiversity, as various and 
different species and ecosystems processes are able to provide the same ecological function (e.g., habitat 
function, climate regulation function). Moreover, ecological functions heavily depend on the structure 
and properties of ecosystems and on their distribution in space and time, which influence ecological 
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interactions and ecosystem resilience [84]. Major ecological studies have thus emphasized the importance 
of adopting an even broader approach to biodiversity dynamics, ecological interactions and processes, 
resulting in a more thorough description of biodiversity. However, the reduction in considering the ecological 
complexity through functional or services approaches does not reveal the difficulties in assessing 
ecosystem services or ecological functions of biodiversity. Indeed, this is not because taking ecological 
complexity account is less high than assessments of ecosystem services or functions are easier to conduct. 
Overall, the BO system fails to integrate and account for the ecological complexity of biodiversity in 
practice. Consequently, the BO process actually has problems accommodating the extensive contributions 
from ecology, especially when assessing biodiversity losses and designing equivalent offsets. The risk is 
that these failures may lead to underestimating ecological impacts, with the resulting incomplete or poor 
definition of equivalent offsets. From that perspective, BO may result in net loss of biodiversity, being 
unlikely to achieve NNL of biodiversity [61]. 
 
Figure 1. A complexity gradient across ecological approaches to biodiversity. 
 Limits to substitutability 
As Figure 1 illustrates, we argue that the degree of substitutability of biodiversity varies inversely 
with the degree of complexity of biodiversity (Figure 2). Mainly due to imprecise knowledge and technical 
difficulties both in accounting for biodiversity and in restoring ecosystems (as mentioned in the previous 
section), the higher the complexity of the biodiversity taken into account, the harder it is to reproduce 
the components of biodiversity, and thus to consider it as substitutable [85,86].  
 
Figure 2. Trade-off between the degree of biodiversity complexity and its substitutability. 
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This leads to a paradoxical situation regarding BO. The NNL objective assumes a strong sustainability 
approach, which in turn implies low substitutability. However, the degree of substitutability depends on 
the ecological approach to biodiversity considered. It will be very difficult, perhaps impossible, to apply 
BO under a systemic approach to biodiversity because of impossibilities in accounting for all the biodiversity 
components. Thus, the NNL goal cannot be met easily when biodiversity is considered as being a highly 
complex object: the higher the degree of complexity involved in biodiversity losses, the less likely they are 
to be replaced and ecological equivalents found. And if we consider highly substitutable approaches of 
biodiversity i.e., ecosystem services or functional approaches (Figure 2), we are failing to take the 
ecological complexity of biodiversity properly into account and this seems irrelevant from ecological 
perspective. This means that NNL policies and BO need to be defined and set up in such a way as to address 
the substitutability issues aiming at accounting the highest complexity gradient of biodiversity. 
Placing the objectives of NNL policies within this context of substitutability constraints raises the 
question of NNL policy trade-offs. On the one hand, there is the will to implement an ambitious biodiversity 
conservation policy involving preserving a high degree of complexity in biodiversity, and on the other 
hand, BO risks falling short of the targeted results because of substitutability issues. In this situation, 
what kind of biodiversity should be targeted in NNL policies, and what are the most relevant ecological 
approaches to achieve it? 
Answering these questions implies political choices based on the science available, and should, in our 
opinion, reflect a democratic choice of the kind of biodiversity we as a society agree to sacrifice and of 
the kind of biodiversity we decide to keep intact instead of pretending that win-win strategy can in most 
cases be found and scientifically supported. Indeed, the substitutability issue must be bounded by ethical 
concerns, based on social choice, for what we can offset and what we must preserve [87–89]. 
We suggest that the BO scheme be reserved for easily reproducible biodiversity i.e., for ordinary 
biodiversity that includes many ecological equivalencies and allows considering simpler approaches of 
biodiversity due to lower conservation issues. The BO mechanisms cannot stand alone as a way to protect 
nature, but need to be backed up by properly-enforced public policy able to preserve non-substitutable 
ecosystems or species. Indeed, preventing the loss of biodiversity that we consider important to preserve 
from damage (such as endangered species and habitats) by strict statutory prohibitions remains the best way 
to guarantee no net loss of biodiversity.  
4.2. Economic and Organizational Limitations 
 The risk of economic objectives prevailing over ecological objectives 
Through the use of economic incentives to preserve biodiversity, a new economic sector is emerging, 
featuring stakeholders new to the world of biodiversity conservation. This new economic sector involves, 
for example, environmental consultants, ecological engineering firms, companies and collaborative 
organizations whose primary aims are not necessarily those of biodiversity conservation. In the US 
where the offsetting sector is operating for a long time, the size of the overall annual market connected 
with BO is about USD 2.4–4.0 billion [8]. The BO system thus obviously encompasses more than purely 
environmental objectives; substantial lobbying now surrounds this market, with explicitly financial goals 
to be reached through “business solutions for a sustainable world” (http://www.wbcsd.org/home.aspx). 
The risk here is drifting away from a system aimed at preserving biodiversity towards a system aimed at 
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ensuring economic outcomes [60]. This could have the perverse effect, as recent studies have shown [53,60], 
of encouraging some stakeholders to favor economic objectives over ecological objectives in order to 
preserve the link between the economic sector and the BO system. 
 The limited ability of economic design to meet ecological concerns 
While the banking mechanism is currently seen as the best way to perform BO from an ecological 
and an economic standpoint, this ecological and organizational efficiency carries risks. It could well 
encourage BO to be selected in preference to making initial efforts to avoid or minimize impacts on 
biodiversity. It needs to be remembered that the BO system necessarily implies ecological damage. 
Moreover, from an economic perspective, the proper functioning of this system implies assumptions on 
biodiversity assets. The banking system requires the most homogeneous and standardized biodiversity 
units to encourage trading of biodiversity credits. The more complex and specific the biodiversity credits, 
the harder it is for the offsetting bank to find buyers and sell its credits. In addition to the substitutability 
issues mentioned above, the economic mechanism behind the banking mechanism makes it difficult to 
target complex biodiversity with strong asset specificity. Even in the most effective mechanism, the 
banking system can thus lead to strong reduction in the complexity of biodiversity due to economic 
constraints imposing simplified biodiversity credits. 
 Organizational limitations: institutional risks 
In examining the BO mechanisms, we emphasized the importance of the institutional environment in 
ensuring good performance. The history of US legislation on BO shows that imprecise rules and the 
instability of the BO system leads in practice to offsetting failures. In fact, when an offsetting system is 
poorly designed and supervised, opportunistic behaviors can even lead to biodiversity losses. Nonetheless, 
some studies indicate that a certain flexibility needs to be maintained, for instance so as to allow the 
system to adapt to unexpected events resulting from environmental factors (e.g., species change in the 
context of climate changes) [90]. However, this institutionalization of the BO system depends on political 
will. Thus, under US and Australian legislation, the offsetting banking system is now well framed and 
regulated, leading to an improved BO system [49,50]. Better definition of the rules of the banking system 
encouraged bank operators to invest in conservation actions and developers to use the system. Elsewhere, 
especially in Europe, environmental regulations tied to BO liabilities have recently been significantly 
reinforced, but the banking system is still in experimental stages in most countries (France, United 
Kingdom, Germany) [8]. While this mechanism has begun to be introduced into environmental legislation, 
the design of current policy does not meet expectations because there are still many remaining institutional 
and organizational challenges to BO success. 
5. Conclusions 
The first objective of this paper was to clarify the economic background to the BO approach to 
biodiversity conservation. We showed that welfare economics and ecological economics offer relevant 
frameworks to analyze the BO approach. Whilst the basic assumptions behind these two approaches 
differ mainly in how they consider the substitutability and sustainability issues regarding capital, they both 
reveal the attractiveness of the BO concept and justify its use to address environmental externalities. 
However, they do not consider the same equivalence criteria and therefore do not involve the same 
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performance criteria for BO. Welfare economics looks at equivalence in terms of utility, whereas ecological 
economics requires an ecological equivalence. Moreover, we showed that depending on the NNL policy 
goals, the BO system may consider different components of biodiversity involving different ecological 
approaches to biodiversity and resulting in different performance criteria and metrics used to assess 
losses and gains of biodiversity. 
The second objective of this paper was to provide performance analysis of the three different BO 
mechanisms and highlight the main structural limitations of the BO approach in meeting biodiversity 
conservation objectives. Focused on ecological dimension, the banking mechanism ensures greater 
ecological effectiveness of offsets than the direct approach. However, in terms of ecological and 
geographical equivalence, the direct offsets approach is better at taking specific ecological features into 
account. From an economic perspective, the banking mechanism is more efficient than the direct offsets 
approach, but the economic constraints behind this mechanism can lead to inappropriate biodiversity 
conservation outcomes. Thus, defining a specific institutional framework and clarifying the regulations 
surrounding BO would appear to be crucial to the proper functioning of the system and the limitation of 
potential perverse risks.  
Finally, we showed how the ecological limitations of BO point to a need to rethink NNL policies and 
BO goals in relation with the objectives of biodiversity conservation. In this sense, this paper offers a 
framework for debate on the balance between political will and ecological opportunities. Political 
choices are central to NNL policies, but they need to be based on the science currently available. In the 
light of ecological constraints, these choices will also necessarily involve public consultation.  
Clearly, one of the main ways to improve the BO system is to better incorporate scientific contributions 
and social representation of biodiversity into the BO process. Ongoing ecological studies need to be used 
to support the increasing recourse to BO. Likewise, the scientific community should continue to 
investigate BO both in the natural and in the social sciences, providing both ecological and economics 
insights. While we have revealed the importance of economic factors within the BO process, careful 
investigation of how they operate in each specific project is needed.  
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